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This paper deals with pain anticipation experienced before 
medical procedures. Our experimental results show that 
individuals with lower discount factors are more prone to suffer 
pain in advance. We provide a framework to rationalize the 
connection between pain anticipation and impatience. In this 
set up, more impatient subjects, who only value very near 
events, mainly take into account the negative effects of medical 
procedures (only costs), whereas more patient individuals have 
a net positive valuation of medical events (given that they value 




This paper provides an example of how experimental economics (time 
discounting behavior) might shed some light on the analysis of a medical 
problem; specifically, pain anticipation experienced before medical procedures. 
Time preferences reflect subjects’ tastes toward the present versus the future 
and determine intertemporal choices which involve a tradeoff between costs and 
benefits that occur over time (see Laibson, 1997). We use an experimental time 
discounting test to check whether personal attitudes towards the future are 
correlated with pain anticipation.  
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Recent studies suggest that there are psychological and neuronal mechanisms 
which determine intertemporal choice (Wittman & Paulus, 2009). Time 
preferences are related to impulsive or impatient behavior and it is argued that 
people who maintain unhealthy lifestyles (that is, smoke, eat junk food, are 
sport-averse, etc.) seldom place a high premium on the future quality of their 
lives and typify an impatient personality. In other words, they prefer good lives 
now to a higher quality of their lives later (Cutler & Glaeser 2005, Budría et al. 
2010). 
Recent medical research on nocebo response -- the subject’s negative 
expectation of pain worsening -- shows the crucial role of anxiety on pain 
perception (and reporting). It has been found that anxiety triggers the 
activation of cholecystokinin that, in turn, facilitates pain transmission (see 
Colloca & Benedetti 2007). Additionally, nocebo response is associated to the 
functioning and efficiency of the reward system (Enck et al., 2008). These 
negative expectations increase patients’ level of anxiety and consequently trigger 
an activation which generates pain transmission. 
Our experimental results show that present-oriented individuals (impatient 
people) are more prone to suffer pain in advance. This suggests that time 
preferences may be a complementary explanation to anxiety before medical 
procedures (Colloca & Benedetti 2007). We provide a framework to rationalize 
the connection between pain anticipation and impatience. In this set up, more 
impatient subjects, who only value very near events, mainly take into account 
the negative effects of medical interventions (only costs), whereas more patient 
individuals have a net positive valuation of medical events (given that they 
consider both the cost incurred now and all the benefits to be accrued in the 
future). Our results are consistent with the idea of a subjective perception of 
time as the basis for temporal discounting (see Brañas-Garza et al. 2010, 
Wittmann & Paulus 2008). 
 
II THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section we present the theoretical relationship between time discounting 
and pain anticipation. To do so, let us consider the case of an individual that at 
moment t (today) values the potential benefits of undergoing a medical 
procedure (surgery, dentistry, etc.) tomorrow, that is, t+1. This subject will 
compute today both the cost of the medical procedure (in terms of reduced well-
being due to pain) and the future benefits of well-being at t+2, t+3, ..., T (see 
Golub et al. 2009). Figure 1 illustrates this idea. 
Fig. 1: Temporal prospect 
 
In our approach, the key issue is how subjects value this temporal prospect of 
length T-t. We use Laibson’s (1997) approximation where the utility of each 
subject, at moment t, depends on the well-being (utility of consumption) of 
tomorrow t+1 and subsequent periods t+ τ (τ =1...T-t) discounted by δτ, and 


































τδββδ    (2) 
Equation (1) is the original expression, while equation (2) separates the day of 
the intervention (t+1) from the rest of the days (t+2, t+3, ..., T) to account for 
the fact that costs are incurred in t+1 and benefits accrue in t+2, t+3, ..., T. 
Note that neither costs nor benefits are immediate so both are affected by β. 
Hence, an individual concerned only with immediate rewards (β=0) would not 
anticipate pain in t. Pain anticipation in t is related to discount (δ). Figure 2 
illustrates the effect of discounting (δ) on the valuation of future prospects. 
In Figure 2 we compare the valuation of future events βδτ for different values of 
δ ranging from hardly impatient subjects (δ=0.1) to highly patient individuals 
(δ=0.999), for β=1. It is easy to check that patient subjects value even very 
distant outcomes, whereas impatient individuals give a very low (or no) value to 
relatively close events.  
Fig. 2: Temporal valuation 
 
In other words, a myopic subject (δ=0.1) will value “only” the cost of the 
surgery at t+1 (and will assign very little weight to any future benefits at 
periods t+τ), whereas a future-oriented individual will value both the cost at 
t+1 and all the subsequent benefits at t+τ. In sum, a future-minded individual 
could value a medical intervention positively (given that it is already prescribed 
by a physician), whereas a present-oriented subject might compute only the 
pain. 
 
III VARIABLES & EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Our first core variable—discounting—is usually obtained through a simple 
experimental mechanism (see Viscusi et al., 2008): the individual is asked to 
choose between a given amount of money at moment t, mt , versus a larger 
amount, MT  = mt + b, at moment T (T > t; b ≥ 0). The tradeoff for the subject 
is that he can get more money in exchange for a longer wait. Obviously, the 
decision regarding waiting (T−t) periods depends on the discount factor δ and on 
the value of b. When b →∞ ⇔ only irrational people will not wait. On the other 
hand, for b → 0, nobody will wait. 
To elicit subjects’ time preferences in our study, we asked subjects which value 
of b would make them indifferent between receiving an amount of money M in 
one month’s time and the amount M-b tomorrow. Subjects performed this task 
as follows:  
We offer you 100 euros that you will receive after 30 days. How much 
money are you willing to pay in order to get that money tomorrow? 
That is, how much of the 100 euros would you sacrifice to receive the 
money in advance? 
From the 100 euros I would pay _____ euros. 
To create the proper incentives, one subject (out of 40) was randomly selected 
in each of the three sessions to be paid with real money.  
Our second core variable—pain anticipation to medical events—is obtained using 
a self-reported questionnaire. We asked subjects:  
When you know you are going to suffer a painful experience, do you 
start feeling pain even before the experience actually takes place?  
Observe that this question does not mention any specific pain. Instead, the 
individual is asked about his life experience in general, that is, we are not 
framing to any particular event. The question does not refer to general anxiety 
or fear of pain, but to anticipation of an event that will surely be painful 
(“when you know you’re going to...”). Hence, this measure should provide us a 
lower-bound: subjects who answer affirmatively are, in fact, pain anticipators.  
Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) show that this binary variable correlates significantly 
with pain sensitivity (the period of time that elapses before a person experiences 
pain after an injury), but is uncorrelated to pain endurance (the period of time 
that elapses before a person experiencing pain will seek relief from their 
symptoms). 
The experiment was conducted in three sessions at the University of Granada 
(Spain) in September and December 2009. All the sessions were run by the first 
co-author. Questionnaire data were collected from 130 university students (55% 
women, average age=24.4 years), who voluntarily participated in the 
experiment. The subjects were economics and business students (graduate 
students and undergraduates in the last two years of their degree). The average 
health status is high (mean=2.81) as measured on a scale from very bad (0) to 
excellent (4). No subjects reported the minimum level of health (very bad). 
 
IV RESULTS 
Before showing the results, we should mention that 21 subjects (out of 130, 
16%) were unable to perform the discounting task properly.5  They wrote 
sentences like “I prefer money for sure (in advance) rather than future money” 
(instead of fixing an amount), “nothing” or simply left the space blank. 
Of the total number of subjects, 101 completed both the pain anticipation and 
the time preference questions. In the first question, 44% of the subjects reported 
pain anticipation. The amount of money they were willing to sacrifice in order 
to speed up the time before receiving it varies substantially across subjects 
(mean=14.65; st. dev =17.91; min=0; max=80). 
Figure 3 shows the histograms of the willingness to pay for two groups of 
subjects: those who did not anticipate pain (=0) and those who did (=1). 
We observe that the group of subjects who did not anticipate pain (dark grey 
bar) showed lower values (higher δ’s) than their colleagues who did anticipate 
pain (light grey bar). In fact, the number of subjects who were willing to pay 0 
in order to get the payment in advance is much higher among those who did 
not anticipate pain (37%) than among those who did (8%). 
Fig. 3: Histograms of impatience by pain anticipation 
 
These results illustrate how pain anticipation and impatience are positively 
correlated. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reports the same result (Z=0.41; p-
value=0.00). In sum, subjects belonging to both categories do not behave 
similarly, that is, they are not drawn from the same population.  
                                                            
5 Payment cards (an alternative elicitation device where subjects face a sequence of scenarios) 
usually produce a similar rate of inconsistencies (around 20%). 
Therefore, we can conclude that present-oriented individuals are more prone to 
suffer pain in advance. 
 
V DISCUSSION 
This paper shows that anticipatory pain is related to time discounting. In the 
medical literature pain anticipation is attributed to anxiety (Colloca & 
Benedetti, 2007). We rationalize pain anticipation considering that subjects 
value not only their present well-being but also their future health status. Since 
subjects differ in their time preferences, we find that some individuals mainly 
weight the prospect of pain associated to a medical procedure and heavily 
discount the future benefits, while others have a higher discount factor (δ) and 
weight the future benefits highly. In this framework, anxiety could be the 
consequence of time preferences which assign a high value to a painful event 
which is close in time. 
An interesting avenue for further research is suggested by recent work in 
Neuroeconomics (Fehr, 2002; McClure et al., 2004, 2007). When an 
intertemporal choice includes an immediate reward, limbic reward-related areas 
show greater activity than when the alternatives include only delayed rewards. 
In contrast, the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex (areas commonly 
associated with deliberative cognitive processes, including future planning) do 
not exhibit sensitivity to immediacy although they react to intertemporal 
choices in general. People with greater activation in the limbic rewards region 
are more present oriented (Hariri et al., 2006). 
This literature has also dealt with negative rewards (Knutson and Peterson, 
2005), which are relevant to our research on pain anticipation. It has been 
suggested that the expectation of losses does not activate the same areas of the 
brain as the expectation of gains. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) showed that the 
prospect of a $5 gain activated the nucleus accumbens, while the anticipation of 
a $5 loss did not. The possibility of a negative reward generates greater overall 
brain activity and slower response times than in the case of a positive reward 
(Camerer, 2003; Smith, et al., 2002). 
Intertemporal decisions are important in economics as individuals show 
heterogeneity on how they take decisions in this respect. This heterogeneity, 
which could be due to a different functioning of the relevant areas in the brain, 
is formalized through differences in the discount factor. Our experimental 
results suggest a relationship between suffering and anxiety prior to medical 
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